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1. Introduction  
Air transportation not only contributes to passengers’ wellbeing and logistics services, but also 
provides essential inputs to economic activities in other sectors such as tourism, trade, investment, and 
supply chain activities. It is very important for an economy to have access to high quality aviation 
services at competitive cost levels. This is particularly the case for Australia, where passengers rely 
almost exclusively on aviation to reach the rest of the world. In the domestic market, there are often 
long distances between populations and economic centers (Donehue and Baker 2012). The plan to 
link major cities with high-speed rail, despite the extensive policy debates and numerous studies 
carried out in the past half a century, remains on paper. It is important for Australian policy-makers to 
ensure that the nation has a well-performing aviation industry.  
However, it has not always been clear what the optimal industry policy is and the aviation market in 
Australia has undergone dynamic changes. Douglas (1993) claimed that the Australian domestic 
market is a natural duopoly, which means the market is too small relative to the cost structures of the 
airlines, to support three major airlines operating jet aircraft. Douglas argued that as long as the 
incumbent match the price reductions of an entrant, the new airline’s attempts to increase the market 
share by price reduction will fail and this will only lead to losses for both the new and existing 
airlines. This may have justified Australia’s earlier “two airline policy,” which mandated a duopoly 
between Ansett and Trans Australia Airlines (acquired by Qantas in 1992). Following the successful 
deregulation of the U.S. domestic aviation market, Australia abolished the two airline policy under the 
Airline Agreement Termination Act in 1990, along with many restrictions and regulations regarding 
prices, control of flight routes, and carrying capacity, and new airlines were allowed to enter all 
domestic routes (Forsyth 1998). The first low cost carrier (LCC) Compass I was established in 1990 
but quickly failed. Compass II commenced operations in 1992 but collapsed in 1993. The entry of 
Compass triggered price wars in the domestic market and airfares became cheaper and the airlines 
reported major losses for the first half of the year. (Douglas 1993). Impulse Airlines was established 
1992 and operated between 1994 and 2004. It was merged with Qantas and ceased operation in 2004 
after the launch of Jetstar, an LCC owned by Qantas. In 2000, Virgin Blue entered the market with a 
low cost model, and filled the market gap caused by the failures of Compass I and Compass II 
(Forsyth 2003a).  
The oligopoly market structure did not last very long, however. Shortly after the entry of Virgin Blue, 
Ansett went bankrupt, which gave Virgin Blue an opportunity to quickly expand its network (Whyte 
et al. 2012). With growth of 300% in passenger numbers in its first three years, Virgin Blue became 
the second largest carrier in Australia (Whyte et al. 2012). The market soon again evolved toward a 
duopoly between Qantas and Virgin, albeit in a different from. To compete with the rising Virgin 
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Blue, Qantas created a low cost subsidiary, Jetstar, in 2003, under what is known as the airline-within-
airlines (AinA) strategy in the industry. Over time, Virgin Blue gradually shifted away from the LCC 
model by introducing priority check-in, in-flight entertainment, and meals and beverages for its 
premium passengers to capture the corporate and government markets (Whyte et al. 2012). It also 
created a frequent flyer program and eventually became a full service airline (FSA) and rebranded 
itself as Virgin Australia in 2012. In 2013, Virgin purchased 60% equity in Tiger Airways Australia, 
another major LCC in Australia. Tiger Airways, which was renamed Tigerair, became 100% owned 
by Virgin in 2014 after Virgin acquired the remaining 40% stake from Singapore airlines. As a result, 
the domestic market has returned to the duopoly market structure, this time between two airline 
groups: the Qantas group (FSA Qantas plus low cost subsidiary JetStar) vis-à-vis the Virgin group 
(FSA Virgin Australia plus low cost subsidiary Tigerair).  
The Australian aviation market is now far more liberal than in the days of the “two airline policy” 
before the 1990s. Although there has been some debate on foreign investment and subsidies, the 
barrier to establishing an airline in Australia is generally low and foreign companies can compete in 
the domestic market through local subsidiaries. Nonetheless, the regulator has been cautiously 
maintaining sufficient competition in the market. For example, the proposed merger between Qantas 
and Air New Zealand in 2004 was rejected by both the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission and the New Zealand Commerce Commission, mainly due to the concern that 
competition may be reduced. The airline industry is not perfectly contestable. Although fierce 
competition between Qantas and Virgin has been observed, it is unclear whether sufficient 
competition can be maintained between two dominant airline groups that have a long history of multi-
market contact.1 Thus, it is important for policy makers and industry practitioners to develop a good 
understanding of the market dynamics in the era of the “new duopoly.”  
A study of the Australian market will also contribute valuable insights to the aviation literature. 
Although the issues of product line choice and multiproduct competition have been extensively 
discussed in the economics and management literature (Gilbert and Matutes 1993; Porter 1980, 1996; 
Klemperer and Padilla 1997; Johnson and Myatt 2003, 2006), few studies have empirically analyzed 
these strategies in the aviation industry. In fact, the previous attempts of FSAs to introduce low cost 
brands using the AinA strategy were largely unsuccessful in North America and Europe until a few 
carriers in the Asia-Pacific, notably Qantas, managed to sustain such dual-brand operations (Morrell 
2005; Graham and Vowles 2006; Gillen and Gados 2008). Homsombat et al. (2014) analyzed route 
entry and pricing patterns during 2005-2012, when Virgin alone fought against the Qantas/Jetstar 
group and other rivals including Tiger Airways. Such “asymmetrical” competition is clearly different 
                                                          
1 Previous empirical studies have found that that multimarket contact between airlines may lead to reduced 
competition and high fares. See for example, Evans and Kessides (1994), Gimeno (1999), Zou et al. (2012). 
Duopoly Competition between Airline Groups with Dual-brand Services - The case of the 
Australian domestic market 
Zhang, Sampaio and Fu 
 
3 
 
from a duopoly between two airline groups that both have dual-brand operations (i.e., full service and 
low cost services jointly provided). The aviation industry is yet to understand the market dynamics of 
such a new market structure. This is an important issue because many Asian carriers are 
experimenting with such a strategy (Fu et al. 2015). 
In this study, we aim to fill these gaps in the literature by analyzing the price competition between the 
two duopoly airline groups in the four most densely travelled routes in Australia. Unlike most studies 
that use the average fares available from industry databases ex post (Berry 1992; Dresner et al. 1996; 
Windle and Dresner 1995, 1999; Boguslaski et al, 2004.Goolsbee and Syverson 2008; Wang et al. 
2014; Fu et al. 2015), in this study air fares are collected online prior to the flight departure. This 
allows us to capture the dynamic pricing behavior of the airlines over time. Hence, our study not only 
identifies the competition patterns among airlines, but also offers insights into the revenue 
management practices in a new setting of dual-brand marketing. Our study obtained a number of 
interesting empirical results. First, there is clear market segmentation, which allows the FSAs to 
charge significantly higher prices than the LCCs. Moreover, the duopoly between the two airline 
groups maintains competition among the carriers, whose fares changes are met by the price responses 
of rival airlines. Second, the airlines’ price responses are asymmetric. Despite Qantas and Jetstar’s 
dominant market share, the airline group does not command price leadership. Instead, despite Virgin’s 
moderate price reactions, Qantas and Jetstar adjust their prices significantly in response to Virgin’s 
pricing dynamics. Although the Qantas group gave up defending its 65% target market share after 
costly price wars in 2014-2015, it still responds to Virgin as if competing with an entrant to its 
controlled territory. The Australian domestic market has not reached equilibrium and cannot be 
characterized by a leader-follower model. Third, there is significant price volatility for all airlines, 
with a general trend of price increases approaching the flight departure times. This suggests that the 
airlines in the Australian domestic market, FSAs and LCCs alike, are applying revenue management 
in their pricing decisions. However, there is no strong evidence of price coordination between Qantas 
and Jetstar, although studies have identified clear cooperation in their route entry. This suggests that 
while there is strategic coordination between the two brands, their daily operations remained largely 
independent, a feature which probably explains the success of the AinA strategy in Australia.   
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background of the Australian 
aviation market and the alternative approaches that have been used to analyze airline competition. 
Section 3 introduces the empirical models and estimation results. The last section summarizes and 
concludes.  
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2. Background 
Despite its relatively small population, Australia’s aviation industry is well developed. The aviation 
industry contributes more than $30 billion per annum to the national economy, or 2% of Australia’s 
GDP. More than 250,000 people are employed in the industry, either directly by airlines and airports, 
or indirectly along the industry value chain such as in the areas of training, maintenance, and sales 
(The Australian Aviation Associations Forum 2016). The domestic aviation market has recorded 
healthy growth over the past two decades. As shown in Figure 1, the number of revenue passengers 
carried in the domestic market increased from 28 million in 1995 to 58 million in 2015. During the 
same period, revenue passenger kilometers (RPK) increased from 26 to 68 billion, whereas the 
number of aircraft departures only increased by 11%. On average, over time more passengers are 
flying longer distances on larger aircraft. In 1995, the average flight stage length in the domestic 
market was 604 km and the number of domestic passengers per flight was 47. By 2015, these numbers 
had increased to 903km and 91, respectively.  
 
Figure 1. Australian Domestic Airline Performance Indicators (1995-2005) 
Source: BITRE 2016 
 
Much of the traffic is concentrated in the largest cities and international gateways. Table 1 reports the 
operational statistics for the top 30 most travelled routes in the domestic market for the financial year 
ending June 2016, which jointly accounted for 79% of the national passenger numbers and 80% of the 
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RPKs. The load factors are reasonably high largely because of the strong demand and sharp price 
competition in general.  
 
Table 1. Top 30 Routes in the Australian Domestic Market (financial year 2016) 
Source: BITRE 2016 
Rank City-Pair Revenue Pax 
Available 
Seats LF % A/C Trips 
1 Melbourne - Sydney        8,796,220       10,634,203  82.7       59,593  
2 Brisbane - Sydney        4,608,116         5,682,060  81.1       35,664  
3 Brisbane - Melbourne        3,438,690         4,329,938  79.4       26,007  
4 Gold Coast - Sydney        2,702,341         3,164,392  85.4       18,421  
5 Adelaide - Melbourne        2,362,739         2,995,355  78.9       19,195  
6 Melbourne - Perth        2,121,994         2,638,271  80.4       11,906  
7 Gold Coast - Melbourne        1,898,578         2,299,293  82.6       12,344  
8 Adelaide - Sydney        1,869,800         2,339,897  79.9       14,300  
9 Perth - Sydney        1,760,030         2,189,274  80.4         9,146  
10 Hobart - Melbourne        1,526,148         1,908,114  80.0       12,051  
11 Brisbane - Cairns        1,333,793         1,607,275  83.0       10,037  
12 Cairns - Sydney        1,075,721         1,285,725  83.7         7,467  
13 Brisbane - Perth        1,000,679         1,243,130  80.5         5,801  
14 Canberra - Melbourne        1,000,550         1,419,863  70.5       10,742  
15 Brisbane - Townsville           983,907         1,335,218  73.7         9,018  
16 Canberra - Sydney           948,981         1,357,667  69.9       17,430  
17 Launceston - Melbourne           908,849         1,185,102  76.7         8,937  
18 Adelaide - Brisbane           813,875         1,084,677  75.0         6,748  
19 Cairns - Melbourne           802,231            962,784  83.3         5,155  
20 Brisbane - Mackay           700,013            959,930  72.9         7,766  
21 Adelaide - Perth           616,617            823,522  74.9         5,725  
22 Hobart - Sydney           583,492            706,961  82.5         4,363  
23 Brisbane - Rockhampton           572,318            797,249  71.8         9,524  
24 Brisbane - Canberra           562,033            764,327  73.5         5,885  
25 Brisbane - Newcastle           556,576            736,120  75.6         6,094  
26 Karratha - Perth           551,168            966,154  57.0         7,515  
27 Sunshine Coast - Sydney           513,619            619,935  82.9         3,594  
28 Melbourne - Newcastle           439,186            550,908  79.7         3,115  
29 Melbourne - Sunshine Coast           427,132            503,847  84.8         2,832  
30 Brisbane - Darwin           402,798            515,466  78.1         3,133  
 
The healthy growth of the aviation market can be partly attributed to Australia’s resilient economy 
and the deregulation of the aviation industry. Prior to the 1990 Airline Agreement Termination Act, 
for four decades Australia’s domestic market was governed by the “two airline policy,” which ensured 
a duopoly between Ansett and Trans Australia Airlines. The two airlines served all of the major 
domestic routes and some regional routes with identical planes, schedules, and prices. As a result, 
each airline held approximately 50 percent of the market share (Quiggin 1997). The main criticisms of 
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this policy included low productivity, high costs, high air fares, and limited quality service choices for 
consumers. Since the abolishment of the two airline policy, the Australian domestic airline sector has 
been largely deregulated, except for international air transport to and from Australia, which is still 
subject to bi-lateral agreements (Kain and Webb 2003). It is well recognized that deregulation and 
liberalization are likely to promote competition and efficiency in the aviation market (Fu et al. 2010). 
Indeed, numerous benefits of deregulation have been identified, including reductions in the average 
and discount fares as a result of more vigorous competition, increased flight frequency, increased 
domestic passenger numbers, better service, and improved on-time performance (BTCE 1995). The 
policy on foreign investment in Australia’s aviation industry has been further liberalized. Formal 
approval by the Foreign Investment Review Board is usually not necessary, although foreign 
ownership in domestic airlines was capped at 25% for individual foreign ownership and 35% for total 
foreign ownership. In 2009, foreign ownership restrictions were removed for domestic airlines, 
although a cap of 49% is still imposed on international airlines. Since the late 1990s, all major airports 
have been privatized, and formal price regulation has been replaced by a “light-handed-regulation” 
(Forsyth 2002, 2003, 2004). In general, the new airport regulation regimes have performed well and 
airlines and airports have been able to agree on most commercial terms after some expensive litigation 
(Forsyth 2008, Littlechild 2012, Yang and Fu 2015).  
Despite the successful outcomes resulting from deregulation and the liberal market conditions, it 
cannot be assumed that there has always been sufficient competition in the market. Apart from the 
short-lived Compass I and Compass II and the entry of Impulse, for most of the 1990s, the two 
incumbent airlines, Qantas and Ansett, did not face any challenges by new competitors until the 
emergence of Virgin Blue in 2000. The entry of Virgin was soon followed by the collapse of Ansett, 
which promoted antitrust agencies in Australia and New Zealand to reject the proposed merger 
between Qantas and Air New Zealand because of competition concerns. Although Virgin and Qantas 
have engaged in fierce price competition, it is unclear whether the airlines compete aggressively when 
the market is again dominated by two duopoly airline groups. Indeed, although there is a rich body of 
literature on airline competition, few studies have examined the case of airline groups offering both 
full service services and low cost services. Price discrimination is traditionally seen as one of the 
sources of price variation and in certain cases evidence of market power, especially in the airline 
industry (Borenstein 1985). Increased concentration may confer market power on airlines, and thus 
lead to price discrimination and dispersion (Borenstein 1989; Stavins 2001). These results suggest that 
there would have been reduced competition following Virgin’s acquisition of Tiger Airways. 
However, other studies have dismissed the relationship between concentration and price dispersion 
(see Mantin and Koo 2009). The effects of concentration have produced mixed results in the airline 
industry, making it hard to develop effective antitrust policy recommendations (Zhang and Round 
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2009). Empirical studies on the aviation industry have also found that changes in the demand 
attributes and product differentiation have interactive effects on airline competition, especially in 
markets with LCC presence (Windle and Dresner 1995, 1999; Bilotkach et al. 2010, Mantin and Koo 
2009, Fu et al. 2011, 2015). However, although the performance of airline alliances has been studied 
for FSAs (Oum et al. 1996, 2000, 2001; Oum and Zhang 2001; Bilotkach et al. 2013), few studies 
have analyzed airline group competition involving LCCs. This study aims to contribute to the air 
transport literature by filling this gap in the research and provide a better understanding of the 
Australian domestic market.   
 
3. Data and methodology  
In this section, we first present the data collection methods and some descriptive estimates carried out 
with fixed effect models. This is followed by an estimation using a GMM/IV panel VAR approach. 
 
3.1. Data collection and descriptive estimates  
To capture the market dynamics among the airline groups, online pricing data for the airlines were 
extracted from www.webjet.com.au, a popular online booking website in Australia. Mumbower et al. 
(2014) pointed out that the Internet has become an important channel for airlines, which has made it 
much easier for consumers to compare prices across multiple competitors. At the same time, airline 
companies can easily check the behavior of consumers and respond with appropriate pricing strategies 
to maximize their profits (Moreno-Izquierdo et al. 2015). The price data are on one-way airfares on 
the four most heavily travelled domestic routes in Australia, namely, Sydney-Melbourne, Sydney-
Brisbane, Melbourne-Brisbane, and Sydney-Gold Coast, which currently account for about one third 
of the Australian domestic market. In many other markets, roundtrip flights almost always cost less 
than the sum of the two one-way trips on the same route. In Australia, the airfare on many domestic 
routes is simply the sum of the two one-way prices. Therefore, we only extract one-way airfares for 
the aforementioned routes. The period of data collection ran from 02/05/2016 to 29/05/2016. On each 
morning at around 7 am during this period, the lowest prospective airfares before 9 am, between 9 am 
to 6 pm and after 6 pm, on the 28th day, 21st day, 14th day, 7th day, and the next day from the 
observation day for each of the four airlines were recorded. For example, on the first observation day 
02/05/2016, the price information on 29/05/2016, 22/05/2016, 15/05/2016, 08/05/2016, and 
03/05/2016 was gathered. On the second observation day 03/05/2016, the airfare data on 30/05/2016, 
23/05/2016, 16/05/2016, 09/05/2016, and 04/03/2016 were collected. This process was not completed 
until 29/05/2016, when the price data on 25/06/2016, 18/06/2016, 11/06/2016, 04/06/2016, and 
30/05/2016 were extracted. Similar data collection methods have been used in studies on online 
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pricing patterns (see, for example, Bilotkach et al. 2010, Mumbower et al. 2014, and Bilotkach et al. 
2015). Although online databases are good representatives of the airline real-time prices that are 
available to consumers, it should be noted that there may be slight variation in prices when consumers 
actually purchase tickets at different times from our observation times, or purchase them from another 
website.  
Table 2 reports the “best discount” average fares and standard deviations for the four airlines on four 
routes collected 28 days, 21 days, 14 days, 7 days, and 1 day before departure. In general, the prices 
tend to increase as the departure date approaches. For most of the time, Qantas tends to charge the 
highest prices on the same route, but one day before the departure, Virgin’s prices often overtake 
those of Qantas. In general, however, the prices charged by Qantas and Virgin are comparable, and 
are higher than those offered by the LCC brands Jetstar and Tiger.  
Table 2. Average Fares Charged by Airlines on Different Routes  
(standard deviation in parentheses)  
  28 days 21 days 14 days 7 days 1 day 
Sydney-
Melbourne  
Qantas  159.38 
(24.19) 
159.90 
(22.55) 
163.69 
(25.94) 
172.86 
(30.66) 
213.02 
(61.15) 
 Virgin  136.73 
(19.17) 
139.31 
(19.91) 
145 
(28.47) 
162.90 
(34.47) 
200.76 
(62.91) 
 Jetstar 62.69 
(22.36) 
65.40 
(22.80) 
66.83 
(22.73) 
75.43 
(30.77) 
110.46 
(51.29) 
 Tiger  68.82 
(22.37) 
72.71 
(18.81) 
80.52 
(26.56) 
83.75 
(27.09) 
122.01 
(54.75) 
Sydney-
Brisbane  
Qantas  153.67 
(30.17) 
161.10 
(23.52) 
164.28 
(25.96) 
158.92 
(14.31) 
177.43 
(66.97) 
 Virgin  128.40 
(33.95) 
129.45 
(39.02) 
140.50 
(34.79) 
142.25 
(28.55) 
180.94 
(63.50) 
 Jetstar 80.34 
(30.68) 
84.30 
(31.94) 
93.61 
(34.71) 
103.56 
(37.05) 
140.42 
(60.95) 
 Tiger  62.82 
(31.02) 
67.54 
(30.35) 
88.13 
(46.41) 
94.27 
(54.78) 
126.89 
(55.32) 
Melbourne-
Brisbane   
Qantas  194.06 
(31.56) 
194.29 
(26.24) 
203.83 
(27.41) 
202.48 
(17.53) 
213.35 
(38.23) 
 Virgin  159.55 
(38.73) 
158.55 
(35.29) 
169.35 
(42.09) 
183.52 
(37.53) 
216.13 
(79.49) 
 Jetstar 106.84 
(25.79) 
111.57 
(24.59) 
115.14 
(32.51) 
122.93 
(36.39) 
161.50 
(67.51) 
 Tiger  86.15 
(42.68) 
88.39 
(23.76) 
96.11 
(35.31) 
104.88 
(37.56) 
156.18 
(59.05) 
Sydney-Gold 
Coast 
Qantas  123.97 
(24.12) 
129.48 
(28.77) 
132.52 
(31.74) 
134.39 
(30.01) 
149.67 
(48.59) 
 Virgin  110.48 
(29.64) 
109.36 
(21.89) 
118.12 
(28.58) 
124.37 
(35.58) 
155.67 
(71.25) 
 Jetstar 60.45 
(24.36) 
65.24 
(24.65) 
66.16 
(26.90)) 
70.23 
(21.87) 
96.85 
(43.98) 
 Tiger  55.83 
(29.05) 
64.35 
(29.83) 
72.90 
(36.69) 
70.12 
(35.04) 
101.17 
(48.59) 
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To test these patterns formally, we first consider a fixed effects model to characterize the fares along 
several dimensions. To set the stage for the estimates presented below, we start with a basic 
specification given by: 
(1)        𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑗 + 𝛿𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑗 +𝛿𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛿𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀 , 
where the dependent variable is the fare of carrier i on route r charged w days before departure at time 
t; Cj are dummy variables for j = Qantas; Virgin; Jetstar indicating fares of carrier j and zero 
otherwise, with the reference base being Tigerair. The variables 𝛿𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒, 𝛿𝑑𝑎𝑦, and 𝛿𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 constitute a 
route fixed effect, and day and time fixed effects, respectively. We cluster standard errors at the route 
level to make their estimation robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (see Bertrand et al. 
2004) among fares within the same route. Our parameters of interest are 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3, which capture 
the average differences in fares charged by Qantas, Virgin, and Jetstar in comparison to Tigerair.  
In addition to providing average fare differences, we aim to characterize how the fares vary 
approaching flight departure. This is achieved by considering a specification that allows the effect of 
Cj in equation 1 to vary with days, so that Eq. 1 is rewritten as:  
(2)       𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽0 + ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘𝐶𝑗𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑘 + 𝛿𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑗 +𝛿𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛿𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀 , 
where 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑘 are dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the departure occurs in 27, 21, 14, 7, 
and 1 day respectively, and zero otherwise. The coefficients 𝛽𝑗𝑘  capture the average fare differences 
in comparison to the fare charged by Tigerair one day before departure. The OLS estimation results 
for Equations (1) and (2) are reported in Table 3.  
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Table 3. Estimation Results for Equations (1) and (2)  
 
Variables 
Eq(1) Eq.(2) 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Qantas  .729*** 73.64 
  Virgin .600*** 62.89 
  Jetstar .062*** 6.35 
  Qantas 28 days  
  
.309*** 14.42 
Qantas 21 days 
  
.333*** 15.51 
Qantas 14 days 
  
.361*** 16.62 
Qantas 7 days 
  
.371*** 17.27 
Qantas 1 day 
  
.465*** 21.6 
Virgin 28 days 
  
.134*** 6.48 
Virgin 21 days 
  
.142*** 6.83 
Virgin 14 days 
  
.204*** 9.84 
Virgin 7 days 
  
.270*** 12.99 
Virgin 1 day 
  
.443*** 21.11 
Jetstar 28 days 
  
-.456*** -21.4 
Jetstar 21 days 
  
-.400*** -18.85 
Jetstar 14 days 
  
-.365*** -17.03 
Jetstar 7 days 
  
-.278*** -13.03 
Jetstar 1 day 
  
0.002 0.08 
Tiger 28 days 
  
-.580*** -26.51 
Tiger 21 days 
  
-.492*** -22.43 
Tiger 14 days 
  
-.387*** -17.7 
Tiger 7 days 
  
-.345*** -15.57 
Route fixed effect X X 
Weekday fixed 
effect X X 
Time fixed effect X X 
Observations 5783 2379 
 
Note: *** stands for  p<1%. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level. 
 
Almost all of the coefficient estimates have the expected sign and are significant. With the fixed 
effects of route, day, and time controlled, there is a clear sign that the fares of all carriers increase 
toward departure day, which is a typical sign of revenue management. Over the booking period, 
Qantas and Virgin consistently charge higher prices than Tigerair, whereas the fares of the two LCCs 
are comparable. The significant price differences between the FSAs and LCCs confirm the expected 
product differentiation between the two segments, as observed in other aviation markets (Fu et al. 
2011).  
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3.2. A GMM/IV Panel VAR approach  
Although the fixed effects models reveal some typical patterns in fares, the estimation may be subject 
to estimation bias due to the endogenous fare competition among the carriers. In this section, we 
consider a panel VAR model with 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = [𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡, 𝑄𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡, 𝐽𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝑇𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡]′ as our fare vector of 
k endogenous variables for routes i at time t. The reduced form dynamic relationship among our 
endogenous variables can be described by:  
(3)       𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴0𝑖 + 𝐴(𝑙)𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,  
where 𝐴0𝑖 is a 𝑘 × 1 vector of time-invariant route-specific intercepts, and 𝐴(𝑙) are 𝑘 × 𝑘 matrices of 
lagged coefficients, 𝐴(𝑙) ≡ ∑ 𝐴𝑗𝑙
𝑗−1𝑝
𝑗=1 , that collect the own- and cross-effects of the lth lag of the 
dependent variable on their current observations. Finally, 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is a 𝑘 × 1  vector of idiosyncratic 
disturbances where (𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 0 , 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑡
′ ) = Σ𝑢, with Σ𝑢 being a non-singular matrix and 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑡
′ ) =
0 for 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠. 
The route-specific intercepts 𝐴0𝑖 in equation (3) are likely correlated with the error term, and thus 
OLS estimation may lead to biased coefficients. A common strategy to deal with this, particularly in 
settings where the sample size is large, is to implement a transformation in the model to eliminate the 
individual fixed effects and then use GMM estimation methods using lagged observations as 
instruments. We follow the approach in Arellano and Bover (1995) and rewrite (3) in terms of 
forward orthogonal deviations. That is, for every element 𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∈ 𝑌𝑖𝑡, let  
(4)       𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = (𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡̅̅̅̅ )√
𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑖𝑡+1
 ,  
where 𝑇𝑖𝑡  is the number of available future observations for route i at time t and 𝑦𝑖𝑡̅̅̅̅  denotes the 
average. This kind of transformation has some advantages over simple first-differences (see, for 
example, Baltagi 2008 and Góes 2016). By using deviations from an average instead of from another 
observation, forward orthogonal deviations reduce data loss and are less hampered by the varying 
gaps between observations, as in the case of unbalanced panels. Following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), 
the instruments list is composed of observed realizations only, with missing observations substituted 
by zero.2  
                                                          
2 These steps were structured in Abrigo and Love (2015), who also provided the computational routine used in 
this study. As detailed in Roodman (2009), from the hypothesis that instruments are orthogonal to the error 
term, the GMM estimator for Aj in (3) takes the form 𝐴?̂? = (𝑋
∗′𝑍𝑊𝑍′𝑋∗)−1(𝑋∗
′
𝑍𝑊𝑍′𝑌∗), where 𝑌∗is a vector 
with transformed variables in the left-hand side of the model, 𝑋∗ is a matrix with lagged transformed variables 
in its right-hand side, and W is a weighting matrix assumed to be non-singular, symmetric, and positive semi-
definite, and chosen to maximize the efficiency of estimation. 
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To identify the structural shocks we need to impose one restriction on the covariance structure to 
orthogonalize the contemporaneous responses, and hence make Σ𝑢 take the form of a lower-triangular 
matrix. In the Cholesky ordering, the LCCs and Qantas are set to have no contemporaneous effect on 
Virgin, while the latter is allowed to contemporaneously influence the former. By construction, this 
reduces the short-term effects of the LCCs and Qantas on Virgin. This approach is adopted because 
Virgin has aimed to further increase its market share in the domestic market, and is effectively the 
only competitor to the Qantas group. Alternative assumptions on contemporaneous effects are tested 
which do not lead to qualitatively different results.  
To recover impulse response functions that characterize the price reaction dynamics, we rewrite 
equation (3) as (𝑙)𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , where 𝐵(𝑙) = (𝐼𝑘 − 𝐴(𝑙)). As described in Lütkepohl (2005), if every 
eigenvalue in 𝐴(𝑙) is less than 1 in modulus, then 𝐵(𝑙) will satisfy the stability condition and be 
invertible. The calculated values 𝐵(𝑙)−1 = Φ(𝑙) = ∑ Φ𝑗𝑙
𝑗∞
𝑗=0  will then be the parameters of the 
moving average (MA) representation of our model, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = Φ(𝑙)𝑢𝑖𝑡, where 
(5)       Φ𝑗 = {
𝐼𝑘,                  𝑗 = 0
∑ Φ𝑡−𝑗𝐴𝑗 ,     𝑗 = 1,2, …
𝑖
𝑗=1
   
Because the disturbances 𝑢𝑖𝑡 are contemporaneously correlated, stochastic shocks to one variable are 
likely to be accompanied by shocks to other variables, which prevents us from drawing causal 
interpretations. However, the imposed Cholesky ordering allows the decomposition Σ𝑢 = 𝑃′𝑃, where 
P is also a lower-triangular matrix. It is then possible to orthogonalize the disturbances as 𝑃−1𝑢𝑖𝑡 
(which will have the covariance matrix 𝑃−1Σ𝑢(𝑃
−1)′ = 𝐼𝑘) and transform the MA parameters into 
orthogonalized impulse-responses, Φ𝑖𝑃 iP. This way, the shocks to one variable will independently 
provoke dynamic responses in the other variables of the system. 
The estimates of the VAR model depend on the choices of optimal lag length. We rely on the set of 
consistent moment and model selection criteria proposed by Andrews and Lu (2001) and 
recommendations for panel VAR models by Abrigo and Love (2015). The criteria of Andrews and Lu 
(2001) are based on Hansen’s J statistic of over identifying restrictions and are analogous to various 
commonly used maximum likelihood-based model selection criteria such as the AIC, BIC, and HQIC. 
For our study, it is obtained that the models should be estimated using only one lag (Hansen’s J 
statistic equals 26.424 for one lag and 10.658 for two lags). We also check the stability condition of 
our panel VAR estimates by calculating the modulus of each eigenvalue of the estimated model. 
According to Lütkepohl (2005) and Hamilton (1994), a VAR model is stable if all moduli of the 
companion matrix are strictly less than one. This implies that our panel VAR model is invertible and 
has an infinite-order vector MA representation, thus providing a known interpretation of the estimated 
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impulse-response functions and forecast-error variance decompositions presented below. Figure 2 
provides graphical evidence that the estimated values of the roots for the companion matrix are 
strictly smaller than one, which confirms the stability of the model. 
 
Figure 2. Roots of the Companion Matrix 
 
In the main estimates of this study, we compute the impulse response functions (IRFs) and the 
variance decompositions (VDCs). IRFs describe the response of an endogenous variable over time to 
a shock in another variable in the system. VDCs measure the contributions of each source of shock to 
the (forecast error) variance of each endogenous variable, at a given forecast horizon. We start by 
presenting the IRFs for our four variables of interest, which are depicted in Figure 3. We note that the 
results from the estimated GMM/IV Panel VAR are the average responses of the endogenous 
variables to an exogenous shock in any variable after controlling for fixed characteristics. In addition, 
because our panel VAR is stable, the shocks eventually converge to zero, meaning that they are 
temporary and the time series eventually returns to its deterministic trend in the long-run. 
For a better interpretation of the estimation results, the IRFs and VDCs are presented together in 
Figure 3 and Table 4. The columns of Figure 3 represent the responses of the endogenous variables 
(i.e., the fare vector 𝑌𝑖𝑡 to a shock of one standard deviation (SD) in each of the variables indicated in 
rows). For example, the first column contains the plots of the responses from Virgin to a shock of one 
standard deviation in each indicated variable (i.e., its own fare change, and the fare changes of Qantas, 
Jetstar, and Virgin, respectively). Accordingly, the second, third, and fourth columns represent the 
responses made by the other three airlines. The solid lines correspond to the median responses to the 
shocks in a 10 period horizon and the dashed lines are the 68% confidence interval. As expected, a 
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positive shock to each of the four airlines’ fares has a positive yet short-lived effect on their own 
(future) fares.  
 
Figure 3. Impulse Response Functions of the Airlines 
 
Note: Each column contains the plots of an airline’s responses to a shock of one standard deviation in each 
indicated variable. The solid lines correspond to the median responses and the dashed lines are the 68% 
confidence interval. 
 
 
To evaluate the relative cumulative contribution of each of the variables to the overall behavior of our 
model, forecast-error VDCs are performed as reported in Table 4. Each panel decomposes an airline’s 
fare changes (variation in response variables) in response to the fare changes by the airlines in our 
sample (impulses on column variables). For example, line 1 in Panel A reports that on average, 
97.25% of Virgin’s price changes are due to its own changes in the last period, whereas 2.61%, 
0.01%, and 0.12% of the fare changes can be ascribed to responses to the fare variations of Qantas, 
Jetstar, and Tiger in the last period, respectively.  
Figure 3 and Table 4 reveal some interesting patterns concerning the fare dynamics on the four most 
densely travelled routes in the Australian domestic market. There appears to be strong competition 
among the airlines. The four charts in row 1 of Figure 3 suggest that Virgin’s price variations are met 
by strong responses by other airlines. A one standard deviation fare change (impulse) by Virgin 
triggers the other airlines to change their fares (response) in the same direction by about $15 in the 
following period. Note that although Jetstar’s responses are of similar magnitude to those of Qantas, 
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they represent a more significant reaction in terms of percentage change because Jetstar’s fares are 
generally much lower than those of Qantas. As reported in Panels B and C of Table 4, in the period 
immediately following Virgin’s price changes (i.e., forecast horizon 1, or the first row in each panel), 
36.7% and 46.3% of the fares changes by Qantas and Jetstar, respectively, are in response to Virgin’s 
fare changes. Qantas’s fare adjustments also lead to fare responses by the other airlines, and these 
changes are all statistically significant, albeit of smaller scale compared to the responses to Virgin’s 
fare changes. Jetstar’s fare adjustments lead to fare adjustments by Tiger but not the other carriers. 
Overall, there is clear evidence of fare competition among the airlines, both within the same segment 
(the full service and low cost travel sectors) and across segments (i.e., competition between Virgin 
and Jetstar).  
 
Table 4. Variance Decomposition for the Four Airlines 
Forecast 
horizon 
Impulse Variable 
Virgin Qantas Jetstar Tiger 
Panel A. Response on Virgin 
1 0.9725369 0.0261153 0.0001405 0.0012074 
2 0.9683173 0.0301076 0.0001668 0.0014083 
3 0.9679194 0.0304729 0.0001792 0.0014285 
4 0.9678892 0.0304997 0.0001809 0.0014301 
5 0.9678872 0.0305015 0.0001811 0.0014302 
Panel A. Response on Qantas 
1 0.3669341 0.6298772 0.0017184 0.0014702 
2 0.3669204 0.6295721 0.001902 0.0016056 
3 0.3669162 0.6295529 0.001916 0.0016149 
4 0.3669158 0.6295518 0.0019169 0.0016155 
5 0.3669158 0.6295517 0.001917 0.0016155 
Panel A. Response on Jetstar 
1 0.4625833 0.0681078 0.4685294 0.0007795 
2 0.4624523 0.0710192 0.4656082 0.0009204 
3 0.4624189 0.0712475 0.4653997 0.0009339 
4 0.4624158 0.071263 0.4653863 0.0009349 
5 0.4624155 0.0712639 0.4653854 0.000935 
Panel A. Response on Tiger 
1 0.5185857 0.0574392 0.1496117 0.2743633 
2 0.5185461 0.0606173 0.1484654 0.2723712 
3 0.5184895 0.0609097 0.1483829 0.2722178 
4 0.5184836 0.0609313 0.1483778 0.2722072 
5 0.5184832 0.0609328 0.1483775 0.2722065 
 
Note: Percent (in unitary values) of variation in the response variables (presented in each panel) to impulses on 
the column variables for five periods following the impulses. 
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The fare adjustment patterns are clearly asymmetric. There is asymmetrical competition across the 
market segments in that fare adjustments by the two FSAs trigger significant price changes by all the 
other airlines. In comparison, the fare changes by the LCCs only lead to price responses within the 
low cost sector. Tiger has been performing poorly in the Australian domestic market and was only 
acquired by Virgin recently. This probably explains why the other three airlines’ price responses to 
Tiger are not statistically significant. However, Jetstar is a leading LCC with a significant market 
share. Although our findings are preliminary, our study of the main travel routes suggests more 
complex competition patterns among the airline groups compared to pure FSA-LCC competition. 
Another asymmetry is between the airline groups. Both Qantas and Jetstar respond to Virgin’s fare 
adjustments with significant price adjustments (recall that 36.7% and 46.3% of the fare changes by 
Qantas and Jetstar, respectively, are in response to Virgin’s fare changes in the last period). In 
comparison, only 2.6% of Virgin’s fare adjustments are in response to Qantas and the response to 
Jetstar is not statistically significant. This is somewhat expected as the Qantas group has consistently 
dominated the market since the collapse of Ansett. Our results suggest that the large market share 
does not automatically give the Qantas airline group price leadership as in a leader-follower model. 
Instead, although the Qantas group gave up a target market share, it still treats Virgin much like an 
“entrant” into its territory. On the one hand, this suggests that substantial competition will be 
maintained in the market. On the other hand, this suggests that the current market probably has not 
reached equilibrium and market dynamics are expected in the future. 
Finally, we did not observe a clear sign of pricing coordination between Qantas and Jetstar, although 
the airline group has been implementing a dual-brand strategy for over a decade. Qantas does not 
respond to Jetstar’s price changes, whereas on average only 7% of Jetstar’s fare adjustments are 
associated with Qantas’s pricing behavior. Homsombat et al. (2014) and Zhang et al. (2015) found 
clear coordination of route entry decisions between the two brands, which suggests some 
strategic/long-term coordination. However, Jetstar has clearly tried to maintain some autonomy in its 
daily operations. For example, the subsidiary chose to establish its headquarter in Melbourne so that it 
can operate at arm’s length from Qantas’s headquarter in Sydney. This is probably an important factor 
in Qantas’s success in adopting the AinA strategy despite the failures of many other airlines. 
 
4. Summary and conclusion 
Significant changes in the market structure and regulatory policies have occurred in the Australian 
domestic market in the past decades. Consistent with the literature, deregulation and airline 
competition have allowed the airline sector to achieve healthy growth. The Australian market also 
exhibits some unique features, notably the formation of airline groups that offer dual-brand services in 
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both the FSA and LCC segments. It is not clear whether the formation of the new duopoly between 
the two airline groups, namely Qantas/Jetstar and Virgin/Tiger, will reduce the competition with 
increased market concentration. In this study, we analyze the pricing dynamics among the four 
airlines of the two groups in the four most travelled routes in the domestic market using panel data of 
airline fares collected online in 2016.  
Our investigations confirm that there is clear market segmentation, which allows the FSAs to charge 
significantly higher prices than the LCCs. The duopoly between the two airline groups has maintained 
the competition between the airlines, whose fare changes are met by price responses from the rival 
carriers. On average, more than one third of Qantas’s fare changes and less than half of Jetstar’s fare 
charges are in response to Virgin’s pricing adjustments in the previous period. About 6% and 15% of 
Tigerair’s price changes can be ascribed to the pricing dynamics of Qantas and Jetstar. However, the 
price responses are asymmetric. Despite Qantas and Jetstar’s dominant market share, the airline group 
does not enjoy price leadership. Instead, despite Virgin’s moderate price responses, Qantas and Jetstar 
adjust their prices significantly in response to Virgin’s pricing dynamics. Although the Qantas group 
has given up defending the 65% target market share after the costly price wars in 2014-2015, it still 
responds to Virgin as if competing with an entrant. The Australian domestic market has not reached 
equilibrium and future dynamics are expected.  
We find significant price volatilities for all of the airlines, with a general trend of price increases 
approaching flight departure. This suggests that all of the airlines, FSAs and LCCs alike, have been 
utilizing revenue management in their pricing decisions. However, there is no strong evidence of joint 
price-setting between Qantas and Jetstar, although previous studies have identified clear patterns of 
route entry coordination. This suggests that while there is some high-level strategic coordination 
between the two brands, daily operations remain largely independent, which probably explains the 
airline group’s success in using the AinA strategy.   
Our empirical results suggest that there are complex competition dynamics between airline groups 
that offer both full and low cost services. However, it should be noted that we only analyze the case of 
the top routes in Australia over a short period. As more and more Asian airlines are setting up low 
cost subsidiaries, it is important to examine airline group competition in other markets with larger 
datasets. In addition, although our time series analysis reveals the airlines’ pricing strategies over 
time, it would be useful to examine airline competition with more structured models. We hope our 
investigation will lead to extended studies on this important topic in the future, so that valuable 
insights can be offered to policy-makers and industry practitioners. 
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